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TRANSCRIPT 
CORRUPTION IN THE NAME OF “DEMOCRACY”: 
THE USA AND RUSSIA IN THE 1990S† 
Alexander Domrin∗ 
Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues – 
Initially, I was thinking about speaking about the Bank of New York 
(“BONY”) case, and about the Bank of New York scandal involving the 
laundering of as much as $10 billion.  However, I’d like to expand that 
topic.  There are two reasons why I decided to do that.  
On the one hand, when getting ready for this presentation, I came across 
a very interesting book which was written by two authors and which is 
dedicated to this case.  The book is called All Is Clouded by Desire: Global 
Banking, Money Laundering and International Organized Crime.1  As I 
understand, it’s the only book in the catalogue of the U.S. libraries that has a 
new special subject: “Bank of New York — Corrupt Practices.”  As a 
review of the book by Frank Scarpittii, Professor of Sociology from the 
University of Delaware says, the authors’ “exhaustive research documents 
the role of the Bank of New York in the theft of billions of dollars of 
Russian assets.  From New York to Moscow and other points around the 
world, this is organized crime at its worst, perpetrated not by street-level 
hoodlums, but by bankers, businessmen, politicians, and others willing to 
bankrupt a nation for personal gain.”2 
The second reason is more substantial.  When you speak just about one 
case, it can send a wrong message to the audience, as if the case was just a 
kind of exception, or as if it was somehow unique.  Well, it wasn’t. 
I teach two courses at the University Iowa College of Law during this 
semester.  And when I teach in America, I try to teach law in “context.”  
Law doesn’t exist in a splendid isolation — that’s one of those things that 
we believe about law in Russia.  Law exists in a broader social “context.”  
It’s not enough just to take a look at a case and analyze that case.  You need 
to see what was there around the case, how it came into existence.  It’s not 
  
 † This presentation was given at the Michigan State University Journal of 
International Law 2009 Symposium, The Global Interdependent Economy: Explorations of 
the Boundaries of International Investment, hosted at the Michigan State University College 
of Law on February 13, 2009. 
∗ Head of International Programs, Pepelyaev, Goltsblat and Partners; Adjunct 
Professor, University of Iowa College of Law; S.J.D. 1998, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School; Candidate of Law (Ph.D. equivalent) 1992, Institute of Legislation and Comparative 
Law; Diploma 1985, Moscow State Institute of International Relations.  
 1. ALAN A. BLOCK & CONSTANCE A. WEAVER, ALL IS CLOUDED BY DESIRE: GLOBAL 
BANKING, MONEY LAUNDERING AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME (2004). 
 2. Id. 
118 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 18:1 
 
right just to take a look at a statute or a Constitution and analyze it — you 
need to know how it was adopted and why.  You need to see earlier drafts; 
you need to see the legislative history.  That’s exactly how one of my 
courses at Iowa is called: “Contemporary Russian Law in Historical 
Context.”  So instead of speaking about the BONY case and some other 
cases, let me discuss them within a broader context. 
As you know, in December of 1991, the leaders of three Soviet republics 
— Russia, Ukraine and Belarus — decided to pull their republics from the 
USSR, which in practical terms meant the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
Following the advice of their Western consultants, on January 2, 1992, the 
Russian “reformers” began economic changes in the country generally 
known as “shock therapy.”  In reality, shock therapy proved to be shock 
without therapy. 
American people still remember the Great Depression of the late 1920s 
— early 1930s.  In all senses, the devastation of Russia’s economy in the 
1990s was far worse. 
By 1932, the U.S. gross national product had been cut by almost one-
third.  But within just six months of the 1998 financial meltdown, Russia’s 
economy had fallen by more than two-thirds.  From $422 billion in 1997, 
Russia’s gross domestic product fell to $132 billion by the end of 1998.  At 
the end of 1929, following America’s stock market crash, unemployment in 
the United States reached 1.5 million, representing 1.2% of the total 
population.  Compare that figure to 11.3 million Russians who were jobless 
at the end of 1998 — 7.7% of the nation’s total population.  In the Crash of 
1929, stock prices fell 17% by year end, and 90% by the depth of the Great 
Depression four years later.  By contrast, the Russian stock market lost 90% 
of its value in 1998 alone.  By March 1999, the ruble — and with it, every 
Russian’s life savings — had lost fully 75% of its value.3 
When coming to power in 2000, Vladimir Putin inherited a crushed, 
looted and humiliated country struggling to survive the liquidation regime 
of the “reformers.”4  The country, whose industrial product had shrunk by 
about a quarter more than during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–45,5 
  
 3. For more on a comparison between the Great Depression and collapse of 
Russia’s economy in the 1990s, see, e.g., MEMBERS OF THE SPEAKER’S ADVISORY GROUP OF 
RUSSIA, U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., 106TH CONGRESS, RUSSIA’S ROAD TO CORRUPTION: HOW THE 
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION EXPORTED GOVERNMENT INSTEAD OF FREE ENTERPRISE AND 
FAILED THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE (Sept. 2000), available at http://www.fas.org/news/russia/ 
2000/russia/. 
 4. The definition is used in publications of Moscow authors A. Anisimov and A. 
Kalinin concluding that Yeltsin’s regime cannot be characterized as an “occupation regime” 
because the term “occupation” still presumes a certain degree of care and protection.  A more 
adequate definition of the rule of Yeltsin “reformers” is a “liquidation regime”, i.e. a regime 
liquidating the Russian state, people and culture. Interview with Alexander Kalinin, Moscow, 
Russia (May 4, 2001). 
 5. Russia’s industrial product has plummeted by about 53%.  Back in 1941–45, 
when Hitler troops were occupying about a half of the European part of the USSR, when 
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whose increase in mortality rates (60% since 1990) had been “historically 
unprecedented,”6 whose population was shrinking by up to half percent a 
year, the country which stood in the 134th place among all states in terms of 
male life expectancy (by 1997, death rate among Russian males had equaled 
that of war-ravaged Liberia)7 and in the 100th in terms of female life 
expectancy,8 whose men had a smaller chance to survive to age sixty than a 
century ago,9 and which had more homeless children than after the Bolshevik 
revolution of 1917.10 
What was proclaimed by Strobe Talbott, then Deputy Secretary of State, 
as the beginning of “national rebirth” in Russia11, turned to be an 
unprecedented social catastrophe, “a catastrophe of historic proportions,”12 
  
more than 1,700 cities and 70,000 villages were destroyed in warfare, and about 26.5 million 
Soviet citizens lost their lives, the reduction of the Soviet industrial product was only about 
30%. 
 6. See Nicholas Eberstadt, Russia: Too Sick to Matter?, 95 POL’Y REV. (1999), 
available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3551987.html (“No 
industrialized country has ever before suffered such a severe and prolonged deterioration 
during peacetime.”).  The American scholar draws our attention to another important detail: 
“Remember: The Russian crisis has erupted in a country in a formal state of peace.  In origin, 
duration, and character, Russia’s mortality crisis is fundamentally different from those 
others,” like in Spain (1936–39), Western Germany (1943–46), Japan (1944–45), and South 
Korea (1950–53), which had “record cruel plunges in countrywide life expectancy around 
the middle of the twentieth century.  Merely to note those dates, however, is to see a contrast 
between these cases and the case of Russia.  The mortality crises in Spain, Western 
Germany, Japan, and South Korea were direct consequences of wars or civil war.”  Id. 
 7. See this comparison at the World Bank Transition Newsletter. The World Bank 
Group, Beyond Transition: The Newsletter About Reforming Economies, April 1997, 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/apr97/pgs24-28.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2009). 
 8. See TASS, Mar. 16, 2001. 
 9. This index is 1.5 times smaller than in developed countries. 
 10. In the end of the 1990s, there were between 625,000 (an official figure) to 2 
million (a more adequate figure) abandoned homeless children in Russia.  See Anna 
Bazhenova, Russia Has 625,000 Abandoned Children, TASS, June 29, 1999.  Newspaper 
stories about kids living in card boxes among garbage cans or about a six-year-old Vanya 
Mishukov who was raised by stray dogs no longer looked like a gross dramatization of life in 
Yeltsin’s Russia and most other former Soviet republics.  Tom Whitehouse, Russian Boy, 6, 
Lived Wild with Dogs for 2 Years, GUARDIAN, July 16, 1998; see also Sergei Rykov, In Free 
Russia Children Are Raped, Robbed and Murdered, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA - RIA 
NOVOSTI, Apr. 17, 1997.  The authors of a new study Young People in Changing Societies 
estimate that about half a million children aged 5–14 who lived in Eastern Europe and USSR 
in 1989 have already died, almost half in Russia alone.  INNOCENTI RESEARCH CENTRE, 
UNICEF, YOUNG PEOPLE IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (2000) available at http://www.unicef-
irc.org/cgi-bin/unicef/research/main.sql?file=scheda_products.sql 
&idprod=383.  The mortality rate among young people rose in 11 (out of 27) post-
Communist countries, particularly within the CIS.  Id.  The danger of a young person dying 
was three times greater in Russia than in Slovakia, the Czech Republic or in Hungary.  Id.  
And these deaths are explained by the report by mainly social causes and could have been 
avoided under different social conditions.  Id.  
 11. Senate Hearing on Russia and Former Soviet Union, 103rd Cong. (1993) 
(statement by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State). 
 12. Eberstadt, supra note 6.  
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which was largely ignored by the Western community,13  “a human crisis of 
monumental proportions,” as it was subsequently defined by the U.N. 
Development Program in its Transition 1999: The Human Cost of 
Transition, the Human Development Report for Central and Eastern Europe 
and the CIS.14   
Senior U.S. officials are certainly wrong when they try to give their post-
factum assurances that the U.S. foreign policy since the Cold War has 
included such “overriding goals” as “to work with Russia internationally” 
and “to support Russia’s effort to transform its political, economic, and 
social institutions at home.”15  In reality, since Margaret Thatcher’s 
infamous endorsement of Gorbachev in December 1984 through the latest 
period of contemporary Russian history, the Western governments have 
been promoting a “strategic alliance with Russian reform” rather than an 
alliance with Russia herself.  A guiding principle of the U.S. foreign policy 
was not to support Russia, but to support “Russian reforms” which “were 
considered to be critical to U.S. objectives;”16 not to help Russian people to 
overcome consequences of the Communist rule, but to help Russian 
“reformers” which is not the same.  
The position of the IMF was hardly different in that respect from the 
position of the U.S. Agency for International Development (“US AID”).  
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Director of the defunct Harvard Institute for International 
Development and an economic advisor to Yeltsin’s Government, may 
blame IMF for “so many technical mistakes.”17  Yet, even the most devoted 
supporters of “market fundamentalists,” as George Soros names Russian 
  
 13. In the words of a British observer, “the only two things that are certain are that 
there will be more unrecorded, unlamented Russian deaths and that the triumphal pageant of 
western-inspired “reforms” will pass the heaps of corpses by, noses aloft.”  Johnson’s Russia 
List, May 27, 1997, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/jrl-ras-archive.cfm.  Other Western 
observers actually welcome depopulation of Russia, because, in a cannibalistic conclusion of 
a Canadian newspaper, “mortality will provide the solution to many of Russia’s transitional 
problems.” Editorial, The Soviets in Russia, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Aug. 11, 1999. 
 14. See UNDP, TRANSITION 1999: THE HUMAN COST OF TRANSITION (1999) 
http://78.136.31.142/en/reports/regionalreports/europethecis/name,2799,en 
.html. 
 15. Thomas R. Pickering, Russia: Sleeping Superpower?, Address at Meridian 
House/Smithsonian Seminar Washington, D.C. (Mar. 28, 2000) (transcript available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/000328_pickering_russia.html) (last visited 
Nov.8, 2009) (emphasis is added). 
 16. GAO, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, HARVARD INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT’S WORK IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 2 (1996) (emphasis is added). 
 17. Interview with Jeffrey D. Sachs, Director, Harvard Institute of International 
Development, on The Crash, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ 
crash/interviews/sachs.html. 
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“reformers,”18 have to admit now that the IMF was acting “like another 
political arm of the U.S. government.”19 
Only in the earliest period of legal and political reforms in the USSR, did 
the U.S. national interests (“objectives”) coincided with the historical 
necessity of the Soviet transition to democracy and the rule of law.  As soon 
as the slogan “Down with Article 6”20 and the never realized slogan “All 
Power to the Soviets” catapulted Yeltsin and radical “democrats” to power, 
the correlation between national interests of the U.S. and Russia became 
less evident.  With disintegration of the USSR and especially after the 
initiation of liberal economic “reforms,” turning Russian into a mineral 
appendix of Western corporations and throwing Russia in her social and 
economic development into the group of third-world countries, the values of 
the Russian transition to the rule of law were finally forgotten and 
supplanted by the interests of the ultimate economic and political 
subordination of Russia. 
This is certainly not true either that Russia’s socioeconomic catastrophe 
was “largely unanticipated,” that deindustrialization of the Russian 
economy was an “unintended consequence” of liberal “reforms” (Thomas 
Graham) or that “when the liberal experiment began, no one, either in 
Russia or in the West, anticipated . . . this strange and troubling outcome” 
(Martin Malia).21  Warnings about inevitability of such collapse and about 
suicidal character of monetarist experiments with the Russian economy 
were repeatedly voiced by the Russian Parliament already in 1992–93 and 
became one of the main reasons of its violent dissolution by President 
Yeltsin.  Dissolution which was unconditionally supported, if not 
encouraged, by the Western “international community” in general and by 
both branches of the U.S. Government in particular.  As it was later 
  
 18. George Soros, Who Lost Russia?, NY REV. OF BOOKS, Apr. 13, 2000. 
 19. Russia’s 2000 Presidential Elections: Implications for Russian Democracy and 
U.S.-Russian Relations, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
(Apr. 12, 2000) (Statement of Michael A. McFaul) [hereinafter McFaul Statement]; 
Johnson’s Russia List, #4247, Apr. 14, 2000. 
 20. The Communist Party hegemony clause. 
 21. Thomas E. Graham, Jr., Putin’s Russia. Why Economic Reform Requires 
Political Support. Reflections on U.S. Policy Toward Russia, 9 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 1–2 
(2000); Martin Malia, The Haunting Presence of Marxism-Leninism, 10 J. OF DEMOCRACY 2, 
41 (1999).  Thomas Graham corrected himself, however, when making the following 
comment:  
The [Clinton] administration backed an economic course — the so-called ‘Washington 
Consensus’ — that did not take sufficient account of Russian political realities, including a 
widespread elite and popular opposition to that course.  Critics were generally dismissed as 
communists, hard-liners, or economic illiterates.  In the end, the administration found itself 
backing a small, unpopular group of radical reformers.  Not only was the economic program not 
implemented, but the way it was pursued cast into doubt American support for the 
democratization of Russia. 
Thomas Graham, US Ignores Russia’s Elite At Its Own Peril, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 
26, 2000, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ 
publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=541. 
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cynically explained by an American scholar, if the “international 
community” gives its support to a “traditionally undemocratic act,” as it did 
in Russia in September 1993, then this act is actually “democratic,” albeit 
“unconstitutionally democratic.”22  As we see, in the coming era of 
globalization and unipolar world, Clinton Rossiter’s classic formula “even if 
a government can be constitutional without being democratic, it cannot be 
democratic without being constitutional” is very easily abandoned.23 
The day after Yeltsin’s issuance of his notorious anti-constitutional 
Decree 1400 (about “dissolution” of the Russian Parliament), Rep. Steny H. 
Hoyer (D-MD) admitted that Yeltsin’s decree was “technically speaking” 
“illegal” but insisted that Yeltsin “acted in the spirit of democracy by 
breaking the letter of the law.”  However, the “primary reason for continued 
Western backing for Yeltsin,” in Hoyer’s words, was not even that he 
“acted in the spirit of democracy,” but that “Yeltsin is explicitly pro-
American, pro-Western, pro-market,” whereas the Parliament “has accused 
the West of seeking to undermine and weaken Russia” and “opposes 
Yeltsin’s privatization program.”  According to the Congressman, “it is 
imperative” “for our own interests,” that Yeltsin’s government “implement 
necessary reforms and keep Russia on a pro-Western track.”24  For obvious 
reasons, the question whether this was “imperative” for the interests of 
Russia herself was never asked. 
The same day Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI) welcomed “the swift, 
unequivocal show of support that the Clinton administration has shown for 
President Yeltsin’s move to consolidate democratic reform in Russia” and 
appealed to the Senate to vote for $2.5 billion in “assistance” to Russia and 
other former Soviet republics in order to “to show the reformers in the NIS 
that we are in their corner.”25  Thus again, the senator unambiguously 
demonstrated that U.S. aid was intended not for Russia and the countries of 
the region, but for the “reformers.” 
The speeches and proposals of Rep. Hoyer and Sen. Pell were quite 
typical.  Another prominent Congressman, Rep. Gerald B. Solomon (R-
NY), for instance, expected that the new Federal Assembly “would almost 
certainly be more democratic and friendly to the West than the previous 
parliament,”26 “truly representative,” and concluded that the December 1993 
elections “have a direct bearing on our national security and should be 
  
 22. Donna R. Miller, Unconstitutional Democracy: Ends vs. Means in Boris Yeltsin’s 
Russia, 4 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 876 (1994). 
 23. See CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT 
IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES viii (1948). 
 24. Yeltsin Moves to End Chaos, Congressional Record, P. E2219 (1993) (statement 
of  Rep. Steny H. Hoyer) (extension of remarks). 
 25. Support for Democratic Reform in Russia, Congressional Record, P. S12239 
(1993).  
 26. Letter from Gerald B. Soloman, Congressman, to President Bill Clinton (Oct. 26, 
1993). 
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treated as a top foreign policy priority by the administration.”  “The 
democrats are in desperate need of outside assistance,” Solomon said, “[w]e 
believe it is imperative for the West to provide as much assistance as 
possible to democratic candidates in Russia,” and called on Congress to 
“divert from existing programs whatever resources necessary to achieve the 
objective of ensuring” victory for the reformers in Russia.27  At least one of 
Rep. Solomon’s expectations came true: the new Russian Federal Assembly 
did in fact become a “truly representative parliament,” but without most of 
those “reformers.” 
The list of similar speeches on the Capitol Hill and in the White House in 
the days of Yeltsin’s constitutional coup of September–October 1993 could 
be continued, but what is really important for us here is an open recognition 
by the U.S. officials of not only a possibility but a desirability of use of 
American “aid” as an instrument of interference into Russian internal 
affairs.28 
U.S. support for such undemocratic and anti-constitutional decisions as 
the violent dissolution of the Russian federal parliament, closure of regional 
legislatures throughout Russia, and suspension (for about 18 months) of the 
Constitutional Court made it clear better than ever before that despite its 
verbal assurances in its interest to see Russia as a prosperous, respected and 
democratic “partner,” the U.S. government was quite satisfied with making 
her a client state controlled by a corrupt dependent authoritarian leader, (“a 
corrupt but friendly drunk,” as he is called by The Washington Post today,29 
a new version of Theodore Roosevelt’s “our son of a bitch”).  It’s highly 
indicative that it was in 2000 only when the former Secretary of State James 
Baker publicly appealed to the U.S. “leaders” to finally “recognize that 
Russia will have its own foreign policy, independent of ours.”30  
Yet, Baker contradicted himself when saying that new “Russian leaders” 
allegedly “reject ‘partnership and friendship’” with the West.  This 
statement, just like a similar Thomas Graham’s lament that “a constructive 
U.S.-Russian partnership now appears a distant dream,” is not convincing, 
because a “partnership” with Russia was never an issue.  In fact, Graham 
recognized it himself in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (April 12, 2000) when saying that “the Administration’s earlier 
  
 27. Elections in Russia, Congressional Record, P. E2534, E2536 (1993) (statement 
of Rep. Gerald B.H. Solomon) (extension of remarks). 
 28. And not just “financial” aid.  Richard Nixon’s foreign policy advisor wrote in her 
book that Nixon was shocked to hear that the Clinton administration had considered the idea 
of sending American troops to Moscow to support Yeltsin’s government in his confrontation 
with the Parliament. “‘What is the matter with the goddamned State Department assholes? . . 
.  You can’t send troops to Russia, for God’s sake.  They already have a huge military with 
its own agenda, and when we went against the Bolsheviks, it was a disaster. Besides, we 
can’t be in a position to interfere in their internal affairs - and militarily?’ he shrieked.  ‘Oh, 
my God!’”  MONICA CROWLEY, NIXON IN WINTER 132 (1998). 
 29. Jim Hoagland, Worse Than Yeltsin, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1999.  
 30. James A. Baker III, Repairing Relations with Russia, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2000. 
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talk of “strategic partnership” created expectations in Russia that we were 
never prepared to meet.”31 
The new Russian Constitution is usually more favorably viewed by 
Western experts than similar constitutions of some other former Soviet 
republics.  It is claimed that “the Constitution of the Russian Federation 
created a true federation,” that after the adoption of the constitution in 
December 1993 “all basic civil rights” exist in Russia “not only in theory as 
they did in the past, but in practice as is true in western democracies,” and, 
finally, that “the Constitution of the Russian Federation creates a genuine 
western democracy.”32  The 1996 Constitution of Belarus, on the other 
hand, is usually seen as not meeting “democratic standards of human 
rights,” granting “sweeping powers” to President and establishing 
“dictatorship” and “totalitarian state.” 
The problem is that often correctly criticized Lukashenka’s Constitution 
of Belarus33 is just a stronger version of Yeltsin’s Constitution.34  The real 
reason why Western official figures and, what is more regrettable, many 
foreign experts react so differently to these constitutions can be explained 
mainly by the fact that one of them was endorsed by an “explicitly pro-
American, pro-Western, pro-market” president,35 whereas the other one was 
introduced by a more independent national leader. 
U.S. official support to the dissolved Belorussian parliament and 
orchestration of anti-Lukashenka’s “active measures” from overseas,36 on 
the one hand, and, at the same time, demonization of the Russian Supreme 
Soviet as “nationalist-Communist bloc,” a “nationalist, crypto-Soviet 
opposition, a band of Communist apparatchiks,” a “band of Communists 
  
 31. Johnson’s Russia List, #4244, April 13, 2000. 
 32. Ronald C. Monticone, A Brief Comparative Analysis of the Russian Constitution, 
in CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIA FEDERATION: WITH COMMENTARIES AND INTERPRETATION BY 
AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN SCHOLARS 7, 9, 14 (1994). 
 33. See, e.g., New York Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Presidential Powers 
and Human Rights under the Draft Constitution of Belarus, Oct. 1996. 
 34. Indeed, if, for instance, according to the Russian Constitution, the decision on 
President’s removal from office must be adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the total 
membership of each chamber of the Federal Assembly, and the whole impeachment process 
is to be accomplished within three months after filing the charge against him (Art. 93), the 
Constitution of Belarus has the same provision regarding voting in the lower chamber 
(House of Representatives), but raises the threshold for the Senate to three-quarters of its 
total composition, and limits the time frame to one month (Art.88).  Yet, the Russian 
Constitution provides for five stages in the impeachment process (including participation of 
both the Supreme and Constitutional Courts of Russia), which makes the process more time-
consuming, whereas the impeachment process in Belarus is to be accomplished in four stages 
without involvement of the Constitutional Court.  In practical terms, however, the 
Constitutions of both countries make their Presidents technically unimpeachable. 
 35. Yeltsin Moves to End Chaos, House of Representatives, Sept. 22, 1993 (statement 
by Steny Hoyer, Rep., extension of remarks). 
 36. See, e.g, Press Release, U.S. State Dept., Belarus: Deputy Secretary Talbott 
Meets with Belarusian Opposition Leaders (Feb. 4, 2000), available at 
http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/2000/ps000204a.html. 
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and fascists,” and even “communist fascists masquerading as 
parliamentarians”37 bespeaks of a policy of double standards, which is quite 
typical for the U.S., but hardly healthy for democratic developments in both 
Russia and Belarus. 
The participation of American consultants in the Russian presidential 
election of 1996 once again illustrated that proud words of U.S. officials 
about the necessity of strict observance of laws in a law-governed state and 
about “the promotion of democracy as a key feature of American foreign 
policy”38 are very easily forgotten when the U.S. national interests — at that 
moment, preservation of “the only horse [in Russia] we can ride,” as Yeltsin 
was called by Joe Biden39 — are at stake.  
Although there is no reason to overestimate the role of Richard Dresner’s 
group in Yeltsin’s victory in 1996, what is really important, is the practical 
lesson given to us in Russia by the U.S. consultants, their attitude to legal 
norms and political “necessity.”  When asked, “if he had any compunction 
about the extent to which the Yeltsin campaign was violating election 
spending laws by many orders of magnitude,” Dresner’s answer was “no,” 
because “Yeltsin was for democracy, and whatever it takes to win is OK.”40  
According to a well-informed American observer, the U.S. Embassy was 
expecting pro-Yeltsin falsifications in the 1996 presidential elections and 
“warned” the Moscow US AID Mission to keep a “distance from 
monitoring efforts that might actually uncover fraud.”41 
As Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State in Clinton administration, 
would say next year: “We are not simply neutral by-standers . . . .  Quite 
simply, we want to see the ascendancy of Russia’s reformers.” 42  Clearly, 
the end justifies the means.  
  
 37. Editorial, Russia Without Rules, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 23, 1993; Celestine 
Bohlen, An Old Georgian Story: Dancing with the Devil, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993; 
William Safire, On Dying Hard, N. Y. TIMES, Sept.30, 1993; Editorial, Detours to Russian 
Democracy, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 30, 1993; Thomas Oliphant, Another Clash with the 
Beast, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 6, 1993. 
 38. Strobe Talbott, The Crooked Timber: A Carpenter’s Perspective, address at All 
Souls College, Oxford University, Oxford, England, Jan. 21, 2000, available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/000121_talbott_oxford.html. 
 39. STROBE TALBOTT, THE RUSSIA HAND: A MEMOIR OF PRESIDENTIAL DIPLOMACY 
59 (2002). 
 40. See Jonathan’s Weiler, Designing Boris Yeltsin’s Victory, report about a panel 
discussion at Duke University, Mar. 26, 1997, featuring Richard Dresner, in Johnson’s 
Russia List, March 29, 1997.  As revealed by Dresner himself, he was on a regular basis 
reporting about the work of his group in Moscow directly to President Clinton’s aide Dick 
Morris. 
 41. Sarah E. Mendelson, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Western Assistance and the Development of Parties and Elections in 
Russia, 30, 31(1999). 
 42. Strobe Talbott, The End of the Beginning: The Emergence of a New Russia, 
address at Stanford University, September 19, 1997, available at http://www.fas.org/ 
news/russia/1997/97092206_wpo.html (emphasis is added). 
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A similar approach was used in the activities of at least two of the US 
AID-funded programs aimed at “developing parties and elections” in 
Russia: those of the National Democratic Institute (“NDI”) and the 
International Republican Institute (“IRI”).  Overall, according to US GAO, 
between 1992 and 1997 those programs received $17.4 million, as a series 
of US AID grants, to “help reformist political parties strengthen their 
organizational structures and their role in elections.”43  Needless to remind 
of the disastrous defeats of radical “democrats,” the main US AID 
“assistance”-consumers,44 in every parliamentary elections in Russia since 
1993. 
In the summer of 1995, the US AID Moscow Mission commissioned a 
report to analyze the “effectiveness of U.S. government assistance to the 
Russian Parliament.”45  An independent expert evaluated the three main 
AID-funded programs working with the Russian Federal Assembly: those of 
NDI, IRI, and of the U.S. Congressional Research Service (“CRS”).  The 
report revealed that the activities of the NDI and IRI were based on 
favoritism.  It found that “most efforts” by both the NDI and IRI “were 
channeled to the education and training of staff workers and MPs in the 
Vybor Rossii”46 (Russia’s Choice) faction.  Yabloko was not forgotten 
either.  A former NDI program officer in Moscow has admitted lately that in 
the 1990s, Yegor Gaidar and Grigory Yavlinsky “appeared to favor trips to 
the West vastly more than they did trips to the regions.”47 
The same report also concluded that “some of the IRI activities have 
been marked by unsystematic and over-demonstrating style,” and that the 
seminars of NDI and IRI “leave an impression of some political show rather 
than profound regular work.”48  Ironically, the group of approximately 3,000 
“reformist-minded political activists” trained by the U.S. programs in 1992–
96 also included Vladimir Putin (“trained” by NDI), who is now described 
by Michael McFaul (an NDI consultant in Moscow in the mid-1990s), as a 
potential “Russia’s Milosevic,” someone “willing to use the power of the 
  
 43. GAO, supra note 16, at 37.  
 44. Peter Stavrakis was certainly right in his criticism of the U.S. Agency for 
International Development: “AID programs have failed miserably in helping NIS states 
develop the limited, competent administrative institutions that are essential for the 
breakthrough to civil society . . . .  Russia and other successor states have inadvertently done 
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assistance goals that promote American interests abroad.  The lesson to be drawn from US 
AID’s encounter with the NIS is that reform is insufficient; if America aspires to provide 
assistance that promotes the development of free-market, civil societies, there is no 
alternative to eliminating AID and replacing it with a leaner, more efficient and competent 
structure.”  Peter J. Stavrakis, Bull in a China Shop: US AID’s Post-Soviet Mission, 4 
DEMOKRATIZATSIYA (THE JOURNAL OF POST-SOVIET DEMOCRATIZATION) 2, 249, 248 (1996). 
 45. U.S. AID REPORT, 1995, (on file with the author). 
 46. Id.  
 47. Mendelson, supra note 41, at 24. 
 48. U.S. AID REPORT, supra note 45. 
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state and ignore the democratic rights of society in the pursuit of his 
objectives,” whose election as a new Russian President was not a “positive 
step” for the U.S. interests in Russia.49 
Although certain aspects of the CRS program were criticized as well, 
overall the CRS record was recognized to be “much better because all of its 
activities are actually connected with the parliament as such.”  As stated by 
Duma authorities, “within one year of cooperation with the CRS, the Duma 
has been equipped with modern technologies for 10–15 years ahead;” 
according to a Federation Council respondent, “cooperation with the CRS 
resulted in the unique computer network having no analogues even in the 
executive structure.”  
Equally important is the fact that when in the December 1995 
parliamentary elections none of the “reformist” parties, except Yabloko, 
cleared the 5% threshold to bring its members to the Duma (by the party 
lists), the NDI and IRI lost about 90% of their contacts in the Federal 
Assembly, whereas CRS, whose credo was to work on an unbiased and non-
partisan basis with all factions and committees in the Russian Parliament, 
maintained all their contacts.  Paradoxically, it was the low-budget ($2.5 
million) CRS Program which was abruptly stopped by the U.S. authorities 
in 1996, whereas multimillion NDI, IRI and similar Western programs still 
promote the “reform-minded liberals” in Russia and train “pro-Western, 
liberal-minded political activists following strategies developed in Western 
capitals.”50  
Interruption of the CRS—Russian Federal Assembly Parliamentary 
Program became a part of a more general U.S. policy aimed at 
circumventing Russian parliamentary processes.51  When it became apparent 
that the new Russian Federal Assembly was as resistant to the experiments 
of “bolshevist monetarists” (Peter Stavrakis)52 with Russian economy as the 
disbanded Supreme Soviet, U.S. “assistance” to Russia gave precedence to 
decree-making over long-term legal institutional development in the 
country.  Much of the work of Western consultants and USAID-funded 
programs has gone towards executive decrees rather than parliamentary 
  
 49. Johnson’s Russia List, #4247, April 14, 2000. 
 50. Mendelson, supra note 41, at 4, 5. 
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legislation.  According to the US GAO, just one AID-funded program — 
the Harvard Institute for International Development (“HIID”) — in 1994–96 
alone drafted “hundreds of decrees.”53  As explained in the GAO report, 
“HIID supported the use of decrees because it believed that they advanced 
reforms.”54 
Having an unconditional support of Lawrence Summers, first Deputy 
Assistant Treasury Secretary for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union and then Deputy Secretary, in 1992–97, HIID was awarded $57.7 
million.55  In addition to the millions it received directly, HIID helped steer 
and coordinate some $300 million in US AID grants to other contractors.  
As Janine Wedel wrote, “using the prestige of Harvard’s name and 
connections in the Administration, HIID officials acquired virtual carte 
blanche over the U.S. economic aid program to Russia, with minimal 
oversight by the government agencies involved.”56 
The energetic work of the program came to a sudden end in May 1997, 
when after a thorough investigation US AID came to the conclusion that 
key HIID players in Moscow (Andrei Shleifer and Jonathan Hay) having 
“gained influence over nascent Russian capital markets,” had “abused the 
trust of the United States government by using personal relationships . . . for 
private gain”57 to be more precise, Schleifer and Hay used inside 
information to invest in Russian government bonds and canceled the 
Harvard project in Russia.  The Wall Street Journal drew the attention of its 
readers to the fact that “the Harvard men had been assigned to promote, 
among other things, Western ideals of fair play.”58  
The repercussions of the scandal had a devastating effect.  In 2000, HIID 
was disbanded.  Four years later, U.S. District Court Judge Douglas P. 
Woodlock found Shleifer and Hay liable under the False Claims Act, a 
federal law that prescribed heavy damages for violating a contract with the 
government. In a settlement, Shleifer agreed to pay $2 million (even though 
he faced damages of up to $104 million for conspiring to defraud the 
  
 53. GAO, supra note 16, at 46. 
 54. Id.  
 55. All but $17.4 million of the HIID funding was received without competitive 
bidding.   
For example, in June 1994 Administration officials signed a waiver that enabled H.I.I.D. to 
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government) and Hay agreed to pay between $1 million and $2 million 
depending on his future earnings.  Harvard University was cleared of the 
fraud allegations but still faced damages for breaching its contract with the 
U.S. Agency for International Development and agreed to pay $26.5 
million.59 
In his opening remarks at hearings on the collusion of corrupt Russian 
and U.S. officials in the 1990s, Jim Leach, then Chairman of the House 
Committee on Banking and Financial Services concluded that the “Bank of 
New York matter raises fundamental issues that demand Congressional 
review, including the extent to which the U.S. financial system has 
contributed to the impoverishment of the Russian people.”60  
In fact, as we believe, the use of the U.S. financial system for the 
“impoverishment of the Russian people” cannot be limited to just the 
BONY scandal. It has had a much stronger effect and should have much 
deeper consequences.  The continuation of the U.S. reliance on a narrow 
circle of corrupt pro-Western liberal intelligentsia (mainly concentrated in 
Moscow and few other urban centers)61 and “agents of democratic change”62 
in Russia proves to be wasteful, eventually unproductive for the U.S. 
interests (if those interests are not aimed at the ultimate subordination of 
Russia and further aggravation of her socio-economic problems) and 
detrimental to the interests of long-term institutional legal and democratic 
development of Russia.  What Western experts should do instead of 
continuation of their futile (and ridiculous) attempts to “pull Russia into the 
West”63 is to follow the advice of Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr.64: “Those of us 
who care about advance of democracy in the world should make it our 
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foremost intellectual and practical task to find out why our reform strategy 
went wrong in so much of the former Soviet bloc.”65 




 65. Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., The Feudalization of the State, 10 J. OF DEMOCRACY 2, 
39 (April 1999).  Paradoxically, the same scholar who correctly states that the failure of 
American “reform strategy” “has probably destroyed Russians’ trust in the West for 
generations to come,” seems to believe that American strategists of ‘reforms’ “do have a 
second chance” and points at China (with its possible future transition from Communism to 
capitalism) as a new object for Western “advice.”  Hopefully, the lesson of Russia will have 
a sobering effect on Chinese people, and they won’t give such chance to their latter-day 
saviors. 
